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Abstract
We show the following:
(i) In existing anonymous credential revocation systems, the revocation authority can link the transac-
tions of any user in a subset T of users in O(log |T |) fake failed sessions.
(ii) A concern about the DLREP-I anonymous credentials system described in [1] and [2].
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1 Introduction
An Anonymous Credential (AC) is a vector of attributes certiﬁed by a trusted
certiﬁcation authority. It can be veriﬁed by anybody, such that the holder (the
“prover”) can selectively disclose its components. For example, she may choose to
disclose only the fact that she has a valid driver’s license, but not her age. Some
of the required properties of an AC are (there are many other requirements, but in
this paper we discuss only the following) :
(i) It should be possible for a user to selectively disclose attributes.
(ii) An AC must be hard to forge,
(iii) A user’s transactions must be unlinkable, and
(iv) An AC must be revokable.
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In the literature, “revocation” has more than one meaning. For example, anonymity
revocation has the obvious meaning: the user is anonymous until Revocation Au-
thority (RA) exposes her identity. Usually this is followed by entering her ID into
a revocation list. Revocation may be partial or total. In the former a subset of the
entries in the vector is revoked, while in the latter the whole vector is revoked (i.e.,
the user is revoked).
We distinguish between personal and impersonal credentials. The former include
driver’s license, passports, attestation that a person is older than 21 years, etc. The
latter include impersonal transferable objects such as e-cash and concert tickets. We
focus on the former. A personal credential must be tied to an ID. It is not the bearer
of the “older than 21” credential who is certiﬁed as such; it is some particular person.
Some notion of the identity of that person must be encoded into the credential, even
if the intended use of this credential is with minimal exposure of other personal
information. For example, a user may want to enter a bar proving just that she
is old enough. She needs at the minimum a photo ID that includes the credential
“older than 21.” And if she is caught misbehaving the police may ask for additional
identifying information that she can then disclose. Impersonal credentials are also
revokable. Our discussion about revocation is focused on personal credentials, and
applies to partial and total revocations.
Ideally, RA should not be able to revoke capriciously. In the case of impersonal
credentials there is a beautiful example where this is made possible. In the 80s
Chaum ([8] and [9]) showed an anonymous e-cash system where double spent coins
(double spending is a crime that should lead to revocation) expose some secrets
about the user. This can be used for anonymity revocation. There were many
followers of this genre. Unfortunately, we do not know of any other example in
the context of personal credentials. Here it is usually up to the RA to decide on
revocation, and he must be trusted not to abuse his power.
Our linkability attack applies to all existing anonymous personal credential
systems known to us. We show that revocation (partial or total) implies that a
malicious RA can link user’s transactions. Speciﬁcally, we show that a malicious
Revocation Authority (RA) can link the transactions of anybody in a set T of
users in O(log(|T |)) fake failed veriﬁcation attempts, in which RA manipulates the
revocation list, L. One may be tempted to assume that if RA is not trusted not to
link, then all we have to do is tell the user to inspect the revocation list, L. First,
in some systems the list is encoded in such a way that the user may not be able to
distinguish malicious manipulation from normal dynamic behavior. Second, assume
that the user can tell the diﬀerence. Consider a 1st run with good L followed by a
2nd run with a bad L. The user will cooperate with the 1st and refuse to cooperate
with the 2nd. This would lead to a similar eﬀect. Realizing that RA must be trusted
not to link user’s transactions (a very natural assumption) may help to simplify the
system. There is a cost in trying to design a system that can do with less trust.
In addition, we raise a concern about the DLREP-I anonymous credential system
described in [1] and [2]. Speciﬁcally, we show that at the end of the issuing protocol
there, the Certiﬁcation Authority (CA) is still left in an ambiguity about which
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credentials he has just certiﬁed.
2 Linkability attack by a corrupt Revocation Authority
We now show a general attack based on a collusion between a corrupt revocation
authority and veriﬁers. The attack assumes a general approach to revocation ob-
served in several existing systems. In the appendix (section 4), we illustrate how
the systems in [7], [5], and [4] ﬁt this description.
A general revocation system:There exists a public revocation list L (or its
complement). L may be coded with some secret keys. We use C(L) to denote the
coded list. Everybody can read C(L), but only RA can write (add and delete) in
C(L). Note that since C(L) may be encoded with secret keys the ability to read it
does not imply ability to interpret it. The prover, P , and the veriﬁer, V , engage
in a dialog, at the end of which V decides if P ∈ L. Ideally it is proved in Zero
Knowledge ([7]). The prover may have many pseudonyms that change over time,
and some may coexist simultaneously. Once a user is revoked, all her pseudonyms
are revoked. Namely, suppose that user i has n pseudonyms pij , j = 1, 2, ..., n.
The revocation condition: If for some ﬁxed i and for any j = 1, ...n, L
includes some manifestation of pij then all the n pij corresponding to the same i
are revoked.
We show that a malicious RA can collude with veriﬁers to run repeated veriﬁ-
cations, e.g. by faking failure, that lead to linkability, of sessions of pij and pik for
any 1 ≤ j, k ≤ n, for all i. Our result applies to revocation list or its complement.
Without loss of generality we proceed assuming the former. Let S1, S2 denote sets,
and as usual, let S1\S2 = {x | x ∈ S1 ∧ x /∈ S2}.
Suppose that a malicious RA wants to decide if two sessions performed under
pseudonyms p and q are in fact done by the same user, namely that there exist i, j, k
such that p = pij , and q = pik. In this setting the ﬁrst session (with p) has already
completed, and the session with q is about to begin. Let {u} be some manifestation
of the user identity, which RA uses to revoke the user whose pseudonym is p.Possible
candidates include user identity, long-term user secret or list of all user pseudonyms.
All these examples yield trivial linkage (without our attack). Our attack covers all
manifestations, even those that by themselves do not give direct linkage. We do
not assume that the manifestation derived from one user pseudonym is equal to the
manifestation derived from another pseudonym of the same user (had it been the
case there would be a trivial linkage via {u}). RA in collusion with a veriﬁer will
challenge q twice: once with C(L\{u}) and then, with C(L ∪ {u}). Then, q and p
are linked iﬀ q is proved included in the second, and not included in the ﬁrst (we
assume here that L is a revocation list. If it is its complement then it is the other
way around).
More generally, let T be a (manifestation of) a set of users that RA and V
want to trace. If they want to ﬁnd out if a prover belongs to T or not, then two
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attempts are suﬃcient - one with C(L\T ), and one with C(L ∪ T ). However,
to link the transactions of any user in T , the collusion requires a more elaborate
attack extending the above idea with binary search. In that case the attack takes
O(log |T |) transactions.
Remark 2.1 One may argue that a user who is ﬁrst challenged with a C(L) that
does not implicate him, and then with a C(L′) that does, may refuse to cooperate
in the latter. This refusal achieves the same eﬀect as a failed cooperation. The
more general case, that requires a few attempts, is more suspicious, but the point
is that we either have to include explicit protections against such attacks, or trust
RA not to misbehave this way.
Remark 2.2 In our linkability attack a corrupt RA must betray her primary re-
sponsibility of being honest about whom she revokes. One may argue that if this is
the case then the system is doomed anyway. However, there is a diﬀerence between
a permanent false revocation and a transient false revocation, as in our attack, that
can be “explained” away later (if noticed at all) as some natural malfunction. The
checks and balances (properly addressing complaints) that must be included in a
well designed system help mitigate the former, but not the latter.
Remark 2.3 There are hopes in the folklore that technology may be invented to
eliminate the need to trust RA not to link transactions. So far all the general
purpose personal anonymous credentials systems that we reviewed succumb to this
attack 3 . It seems that the ordinary trust (not to make permanent false revocations)
is insuﬃcient, and additional trust is needed not to engage in the above attack (using
temporary revocations).
3 A concern about an issuing protocol
We show that at the end of the issuing protocol of the DLREP-I system [1] and
[2] there is still ambiguity about which attributes were certiﬁed. We do not know
how to exploit it in order to fool the veriﬁer in a showing protocol. However, we
think that both technically and legally, the issuer should have certainty about the
attributes she signs at the end of the issuing protocol.
3.1 The system
The system is described in [1]. In particular it is suﬃcient to focus on Figs. 4.7, the
issuing protocol, and the explanations surrounding it. For the sake of completeness
here are the essentials (but for details look at the source). For a concise description
of the same protocol and its context see also [2] ﬁg 7 (note that h in [2] is h′ in [1]
ﬁg 4.7).
Following the notation of [1], let q, p be large primes such that q | (p − 1).The
Certiﬁcation Authority (CA) has:
Secret keys : x0, yi, i = 1, 2, ...l all in Z∗q .
3 Anonymity revocation of double spent e-coins is not included.
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Public keys: g0 is a generator of a multiplicative subgroup of order q of the
integers mod p. h0 ≡ gx00 mod p, gi ≡ gyi0 mod p.
The user’s attributes that CA is supposed to certify by signing are xi, i =
1, 2, ...l. The user’s “public key” that encompasses those attributes is
h ≡ (
l∏
i=1
gxii )mod p
and the “blinded public key” is
h′ ≡ (hh0)α1 mod p,
where α1 is a blinding element randomly chosen by the user from Z∗q .
A signature by CA on h′ is a pair (c′0, r′0) for which the following veriﬁcation
condition holds:
c′0 = H(h
′, gc
′
0
0 h
′r′0)
The signing protocol is:
User CA
w0 ∈R Zq
← a0 ≡ gw00 mod p
α1,2,3 ∈R Zq
α1 = 0
h′ ≡ (hh0)α1 mod p
c′0 = H(h′, g
α2
0 (hh0)
α3a0)
c0 ≡ c′0 − α2 mod q →
← r0 ≡ (w0 − c0)/(x0 +
∑l
i=1 xiyi)mod q
a0 ≡ gc00 (hh0)r0 mod p?
r′0 ≡ (r0 + α3)/α1 mod q
Claim 3.1 Suppose that (α1, α2, α3) are the blinding elements in a run of the pro-
tocol with attributes (x1, ...xl), and the protocol produces certiﬁcate (c′0, r′0) for user’s
“blinded public key” h′. Then for all β the same certiﬁcate with the same h′ is consis-
tent with attributes (βx1, ...βxl), blinding elements (α1/β, α2, α3/β), and h0 → hβ0 .
Proof. In user’s side of the protocol, do the following modiﬁcations: (i) Replace xi
with xiβ, i = 1, 2, ...l. (shorthand: xi → xiβ), (ii) α1 → α1/β; α3 → α3/β; a0
and α2 remain unchanged; (iii) h0 → hβ0 . The result of these modiﬁcations is that
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h′, c′0, c0 remain unchanged. Therefore, the original r0 divided by β can serve as the
new r0 (r0 → r0/β). The check for a0 passes ok (although this is not important),
and r′0 remains unchanged. The veriﬁcation condition c′0 = H(h′, g
c′0
0 h
′r′0) holds after
the attack (since c′0, r′0 and h′ remain unchanged). 
We note that h0 is not controlled by the attacker, however, CA does not use h0
in the issuing process, hence at the end of issuing, CA is not aware of any problem.
It is only at the showing protocol that the veriﬁer uses h0.
4 Concluding Remarks
We presented two concerns about existing anonymous credential systems, empha-
sizing the need for additional debate about the deﬁnitions of security requirements
for anonymous credential systems. It appears that a compromise is required, either
in the security requirements or in the amount of trust bestowed on the participants,
in order to achieve a practical and eﬃcient anonymous credential system.
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Appendix: Trust assumption about the Revocation Au-
thority
Anonymity revocation is cleanly doable in some cases. For example, some anony-
mous e-cash systems have provisions for exposing encoded secrets iﬀ a coin is double
spent ([8] and [9]). In such systems we do not need to put extra trust in RA. How-
ever, this isn’t the case with general purpose personal credentials, where RA must
be trusted not to revoke capriciously. We proceed to describe the revocation mech-
anisms of some anonymous credentials systems ([7], [5], [4]), in order to show that
they ﬁt the general description that we gave in section 2.
The revocation mechanism in [7] uses dynamic accumulators. A dynamic accu-
mulator allows a set of values L (in our case L is the set of unrevoked users) to be
accumulated into a value λ. Then a witness ω can be given to prove that a value
x is accumulated into λ. The veriﬁer evaluates a polynomial-time function g to
check that g(ω, x) = λ. The security of a dynamic accumulator guarantees that it
is infeasible for an adversary to generate a witness for a value that is not accumu-
lated. Furthermore, given a secret key (trapdoor information), a value contained in
a dynamic accumulator can be “deleted.” In [7], a unique value is associated with
each credential at the issue stage; this unique value is not known to the CA/issuing
organization. This value and subsequent values corresponding to all unrevoked
credentials are accumulated into the list L and the accumulated value λ is made
public. During a reveal transaction, the user demonstrates that the unique value
in her credential is contained in the accumulator by proving the existence of the
witness through a zero-knowledge protocol. When the revocation authority wants
to revoke a credential, he uses his secret key to delete the unique value contained in
that credential. After a sequence of add/delete updates, users can recompute their
witnesses even without the secret key. They can do this by looking up a publicly
visible list (e.g. maintained by the RA) for added and deleted unique values from
the time they last checked.
To see how Brickell’s system [5] meets that description, note that the user uses
a pseudonym NV for each veriﬁer, such that NV = ζf , where f is a user-speciﬁc
secret value and ζ is a suitable random generator of a group in which the discrete
log problem is hard; the RA publishes a list of revoked pseudonyms L = {NVi}. Any
prover who claims that his pseudonym NV has not been revoked proves in Zero-
Knowledge, that logζ NV = logζi NVi for all NVi ’s in the list. Thus, the manifestation
function here is a modiﬁed form of discrete log.
Brand’s revocation method [4] can also be reduced to the above standard de-
scription. In his system, each service provider Si has a hot list Li. Li contains
a list of pseudonyms whose corresponding users have misused the system. If the
user’s pseudonyms are denoted by {d1, ..., dl} and if she wants to access the service
provided by Sj , then she claims that none of {d1, ..., dl} belong to the hot lists of
any of the service providers. To verify this claim, the veriﬁer computes polynomials
such that all the hot-listed pseudonyms by all service providers are roots of at least
one of these polynomials. Now the user proves that none of her pseudonyms are
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roots of any of the polynomials computed by the veriﬁer. Thus, the hot lists can be
seen as the revocation list, while the manifestation states that a pseudonym dj of a
user with service provider Sj , is not a root of any of the polynomials computed by
the veriﬁer.
The attack in Section 2 applies to all these systems.
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